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Abstract
This paper studies how decentralization of wage bargaining from sector to rm
level inuences wage levels and wage dispersion. We use a detailed panel data set
covering a period of decentralization in the Danish labor market. The decentral-
ization process provides exogenous variation in the individual workers wage-setting
system that facilitates identication of the e¤ects of decentralization. Consistent
with predictions we nd that wages are more dispersed under rm-level bargaining
compared to more centralized wage-setting systems. However, the di¤erences across
wage-setting systems are reduced substantially when controlling for unobserved in-
dividual level heterogeneity.
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1 Introduction
Several advanced countries have undergone a process towards more decentralized wage
bargaining in the labor market during the past decades. Comparing the 1970s to the
1990s not a single OECD country moved towards centralization, whereas a considerable
number moved towards greater decentralization according to OECD (2004). This move-
ment has in many countries been accompanied with a steady decline in union densities,
while the extent of bargaining coverage has typically been unchanged. Decentralization
of collective bargaining may have important implications for wage formation and wage
dispersion in particular, but only scarce microeconometric evidence exist to document
such e¤ects.
The principal aim of this paper is to empirically examine the movement of decentral-
ization in wage bargaining in terms of its impact on wage dispersion. From a theoreti-
cal standpoint decentralization may lead to increased wage dispersion because rm- and
individual-specic characteristics are more likely to enter the wage contracts, while under
centralized bargaining egalitarian union preferences are easier to accomplish.1 Obviously,
changes in wage dispersion may have important direct welfare implications through in-
creased income inequality, but there may also be more indirect consequences. A movement
away from a standard wage rate applying for all workers means that wages are more in
accordance with individual productivity and local conditions, which tends to reduce mis-
allocation, ine¢ ciencies and unemployment in the labor market. In contrast to this view,
Moene and Wallerstein (1997) argue that centralized bargaining tends to bolster expand-
ing progressive industries and hamper declining ones, while local bargaining allows less
productive plants to reduce wages and remain in operation. Also when risk-averse individ-
uals face uncertainty about their position in the income distribution, unions may improve
welfare by compressing the wage structure, see Agell and Lommerud (1992). In any case,
it is clear that the link between bargaining level and wage dispersion is important for wel-
fare, and a rst step should be to empirically assess the extent to which decentralization
1See e.g. Farber (1978) and Booth (1984) for theoretical models explicitly handling the role of wage
dispersion in union preferences.
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increases wage dispersion.
Another aspect of decentralization is its impact on wage levels. A number of di¤erent
explanations for higher mean wages under rm level bargaining may be put forth. First,
higher wages at the local level may be due to rent sharing, see e.g. Blanchower, Oswald
and Sanfey (1996). Second, rms with local bargaining may encourage workers to work
harder by o¤ering higher wages through e¢ ciency wage considerations, see e.g. Akerlof
and Yellen (1988). Third, rm level bargaining may involve higher wages and lower
employment due to insider-outsider e¤ects, see Fitzenberger and Franz (1999). Fourth,
it may be argued that decentralization of collective bargaining makes it less likely that
unions internalize externalities of many di¤erent types, see Calmfors (1993). For example
decentralized wage increases may lead to higher product prices, thus increasing the cost of
inputs for other rms. Such externalities may be taken into account in more centralized
bargaining settings and may induce unions to restrain their wage demands. However,
Calmfors and Dri¢ ll (1988) argue that the relationship between centralization and wage
outcomes is hump shaped. At the national level unions internalize externalities and
moderate their wage demands, but at rm level they also restrain wage demands because
higher wages lead to higher product prices and lower demand for the goods produced
by the rm, thereby reducing employment in the rm. At the industry level neither
of these mechanisms are present to the same extent and so unions negotiate for higher
wages at this level. For open economies Danthine and Hunt (1994) show that the hump
shaped relationship between wages and centralization level attens out as product market
competition increases and so the room left open for diverging wage policies narrows. Thus
the predictions concerning the impact of decentralization on wage levels are less clear-cut
and is ultimately an empirical question.
We have access to a very rich longitudinal data set for private sector workers in the
Danish labor market. The Danish labor market is interesting to study because four dif-
ferent wage setting systems, representing three di¤erent levels of centralization, coexist,
and so their inuence on wage formation may readily be compared. First, in one segment
of the labor market wages are negotiated at industry level for all workers this is the
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so-called standard-rate system. Clearly the scope for wages to reect individual produc-
tivity is limited under this system. Second, a considerable part of the labor market has
bargaining between unions and employers at the industry level over a contractual wage,
which is accompanied by local bargaining at the rm level over an individual wage sup-
plement (the minimum-pay and minimum-wage systems). In this case wages may better
be in accordance with individual qualications due to the local level bargaining. Third,
a segment of the labor market has no centrally negotiated contractual wage, and wages
are entirely determined at the rm level. Importantly, our data set covers a period where
many labor market segments changed wage setting system towards bargaining at more
decentralized levels. In particular, the importance of the segment with only rm-level
bargaining has increased during our sample window.
The longitudinal dimension of the data is crucial for two main reasons. First, identi-
cation of the e¤ects of decentralization on wage dispersion is greatly facilitated by the
change of wage setting system over time for many workers. The wage setting system
for the individual worker may change because the labor market segment changed its sys-
tem due to the decentralization process or because the worker changed job. Second, in
contrast to the existing empirical evidence, longitudinal data allows us to control for un-
observed heterogeneity. Our econometric approach is quantile regression, since this, in a
very transparent way, illustrates the impact of wage setting systems in di¤erent quantiles
of the wage distribution. However, it is only recently that quantile regression methods
have been developed to better exploit the advantages of longitudinal data, see Koenker
(2004) and Abrevaya and Dahl (2008). We apply the correlated random e¤ects approach
suggested by Abrevaya and Dahl (2008).
We nd that decentralization of wage bargaining increases wage dispersion, i.e., wages
are most dispersed under the most decentralized system rm level bargaining. By using
the panel data quantile regression approach we also nd that the di¤erences in wage
dispersion between the wage setting systems are reduced substantially when unobserved
individual heterogeneity is controlled for. With respect to the impact on mean wages we do
not nd important di¤erences across bargaining systems after controlling for unobserved
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heterogeneity.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briey reviews the existing empirical
literature on unions and the dispersion of wages. Section 3 describes the institutional
framework for wage bargaining in Denmark. This section also summarizes the aggregate
development towards more decentralized wage bargaining in Denmark in the 1990s. Sec-
tion 4 describes the data set, section 5 outlines the empirical framework, and the results
are presented in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Unions and the dispersion of wages
The impact of unions on wage formation and wage dispersion is a subject that has long
attracted the attention of economists. There exists a large literature assessing the wage
di¤erential between union and non-union workers and the impact of unions on wage
inequality (see e.g. Freeman (1980) for an early exposition and Card, Lemieux and Riddell
(2004) for a recent review). This is an interesting issue in Anglo-Saxon countries where
it makes sense to focus on union membership of the individual worker. However, in
most continental European countries the relevant measure is the centralization level of
bargaining, because even in countries with low union densities, bargaining agreements
are typically extended to the majority of the workforce. In this section we briey review
the existing microeconometric evidence of the impact of the bargaining level on wage
formation.
One of the rst studies of the subject is DellAringa and Lucifora (1994), who inves-
tigated the Italian metal-mechanical industry with establishment survey data from 1990.
They found a positive wage di¤erential in rms where unions are recognized for local
bargaining as compared to rms where only the nationally bargaining wages apply. In
addition, they nd that rm-level bargaining raises wages more for white collar workers
than for blue collar workers.
These results are consistent with a more recent paper by Card and de la Rica (2006)
who study the e¤ect of rm level contracting relative to regional or national contracts in
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Spain. They use the European Structure of Earnings Survey (ESES) from 1995, which
is a matched worker-rm data set with information on whether the worker belongs to a
multi-employer bargaining regime or a regime with single-employer bargaining (rm-level
bargaining). They show that there is a positive wage premium of 5-10 per cent associated
with single-employer bargaining. Interestingly, they also nd that the premium is higher
for more highly-paid workers using a weighted least squares approach. They take this as
weak evidence for a more exible wage structure under rm-level bargaining.
Two other recent contributions use the ESES data set for 1995 to examine the e¤ect
on wage dispersion. DellAringa and Pagani (2007) perform a variance decomposition
of the ESES data for Italy, Belgium and Spain. In Italy and Belgium there is no clear
e¤ect of single employer bargaining on wage dispersion, while for Spain, consistently with
Card and de la Rica (2006), they nd a small positive e¤ect. In addition to the variance
decomposition, DellAringa and Pagani estimate a quantile regression model separately
for each wage-setting system to compute wage inequality measures conditional on the
di¤erent explanatory variables. Thus, when taking observable heterogeneity into account,
they nd that, if anything, single employer bargaining tends to decrease wage dispersion
in Italy and Belgium, while the opposite is true for Spain.
Plasman et al. (2007) also perform a variance decomposition exercise and nd for
Belgium, Denmark and Spain that decentralized bargaining increases the mean wage.
Furthermore, single-employer bargaining increases the dispersion of wages in Denmark
and Belgium while it decreases the wage dispersion in Spain which is in contrast to the
ndings of Card and de la Rica (2006) and DellAringa and Pagani (2007).
Using a cross section data set for 1991 Hartog, Leuven and Teulings (2002) investi-
gate the impact of bargaining regime on wages in the Netherlands, and they nd that
mean wages under rm-specic and industry-level contracting are very similar. They also
observe workers in rms with no collective bargaining and in rms with mandatory ex-
tensions of an industry agreement, and wage di¤erentials between regimes were found to
be no larger than 4 per cent. Also in terms of wage dispersion modest di¤erences are
found between the four regimes, but rm specic bargaining yields the greatest residual
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variation of wages.
Comparing contractual wages and actual wages Cardoso and Portugal (2005) nd
for Portugal a substantial wage cushion with industry averages of 20-50 per cent of the
contractual wages. From tobit regressions it is found that the e¤ects of worker and
rm characteristics on contractual wage and the wage drift have the same sign, so that
wage drift stretches the wage distribution. A measure for the degree of union bargaining
power is constructed as the concentration of bargaining and Cardoso and Portugal nd
that the higher concentration the higher contractual wage rate and by interacting this
bargaining power measure with worker attributes the lower returns to these attributes.
Interestingly, the higher contractual wage rate is o¤-set by a smaller wage drift.
The wage bargaining institutions in Germany share several characteristics with the
Danish institutions, so the German case is of particular interest. Several empirical studies
have provided cross-sectional estimates of the wage e¤ects of di¤erent bargaining regimes
in Germany, and most tend to nd that average wages and wage dispersion are higher
under rm level bargaining compared to sectoral level bargaining  see Fitzenberger,
Kohn and Lembcke (2008) for a recent survey of these studies. One study for Germany
deserves special mention as it estimates the impact of wage-setting level on individual
mean wages using longitudinal data. Gürtzgen (2006) nds that unobserved heterogeneity
is responsible for much of the observed wage premia associated with industry and rm-level
contracting (relative to no coverage of collective bargaining contracts), but positive premia
for industry-level contracts in West Germany and for rm-level contracts in East Germany
remain. While we also estimate the impact of the wage-setting level on individual mean
wages our primary focus is on the impact on wage dispersion.
To sum up, most results indicate that wages are higher when they are negotiated at
the rm level as compared to the industry level. However this result is refuted by the
evidence from the Dutch labor market. With regards to the e¤ects on wage dispersion
the evidence is more mixed although most results suggest that local bargaining leads to
higher wage dispersion than industry level bargaining.
A distinguishing feature is that all the mentioned studies use cross section data (except
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Gürtzgen (2006)), and a caveat applying here is that there may be unobserved di¤erences
between workers covered by centrally and locally negotiated wage contracts. For example
it may be argued that if rms with local bargaining reward observed skills such as educa-
tion more generously, they will likely also reward unobserved skills better. Besides this,
if local bargaining is known to imply more dispersed wages, the Roy (1951) model would
suggest that high ability workers sort into decentralized bargaining segments. Hence, we
expect a positive correlation between local bargaining and unobserved ability and that
appropriately controlling for unobserved heterogeneity should imply smaller estimated
e¤ects of local bargaining arrangements.
Along the same lines, risk averse workers may select into centralized bargaining systems
with more compressed wage structures, and they may be willing to pay a price in terms
of lower average wages to do so. Worker level risk aversion is unobserved, so again failure
to control for unobserved heterogeneity may lead to upward bias in the coe¢ cient to local
bargaining systems.
With access to longitudinal data covering a period of decentralization we are in position
to take account of unobserved heterogeneity and we may more reliably identify the e¤ects
of decentralization since the decentralization process safely may be taken to be exogenous
to the individual worker.
3 The Danish wage setting system
Whereas job protection is low in Denmark, the wage setting has been rather inexible 
Denmark has been one of the OECD countries with the most compressed wage structures 
which in part is due to a combination of three factors. First, the benet system is generous
with a high benet level for low income groups and a long benet period of up to four
years. Second, the Danish labor market is highly organized on both employer and worker
sides: The share of union members among all employees remained at a relatively stable
level around 75 per cent in the 1990s, and in 2000 more than 80 per cent were covered
by a collective agreement cf. OECD (2004). Third, wage bargaining has historically
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been centralized, but, as explained below, this has changed during the 1980s and 1990s.
According to Boeri et al. (2001) the centralization/coordination index of the bargaining
system (which lies between 0 and 1) has for Denmark dropped from 0.64 for the period
1973-1977, to 0.47 for 1983-1987 and 0.34 for 1993-1997.
Wage bargaining at the industry and rm levels depends on the wage setting system
used in the industry collective agreement. In Denmark there are four di¤erent systems:
First, under the standard-rate system (normallønssystemet) actual wages of workers
are set by the industry collective agreement and the wages are not modied at the rm
level. Second, under the minimum-wage system (minimallønssystemet) the wage rates
set at the industry level represent a oor and are intended to be used only for very
inexperienced workers. Hence, for other workers this wage rate is supplemented by a
personal pay supplement. In practice, the personal pay supplements are often negotiated
collectively with the cooperation of the workplace union membersrepresentative. Third,
a somewhat similar minimum-pay system (mindstebetalingssystemet) exists. Rather
than operating with a personal pay supplement on top of the industry-level negotiated
wage rate, the minimum pay system uses a personal wage. The wage rate negotiated at
the industry level can be thought of as a safety net in the form of a minimum hourly
rate that must be paid under all circumstances. Finally, under rm-level bargaining the
collective agreements state that wages are negotiated at the plant or rm level without
any centrally bargained wage rates (uden lønsats).
Table 1 shows the development in the use of these four wage setting systems in the
private sector labor market covered by the two bargaining parties at national level; The
Danish Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) and The Confederation of Danish Employers
(DA). There has been a trend towards more decentralized and exible wage setting, where
the proportion with a standard wage rate was more than halved. Since 1993 the most
decentralized segment (i.e. the rm-level bargaining segment) has grown from a coverage
of 4 per cent to 22 per cent in 2004. For the two remaining decentralized wage systems
the minimum-wage and the minimum-pay systems we also see considerable variation
over time. An example of an important bargaining segment making the transition to
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rm-level bargaining is the area covering o¢ ce clerks. In the empirical analysis below we
use data for 1994-1999, so we capture the increased importance of rm-level bargaining
in particular.
Insert Table 1 about here
4 Data and descriptive statistics
We have access to information about individual characteristics for the full population
of workers aged 18-65 years in the Danish labor market for the years 1994-1999.2 These
characteristics are extracted from the Integrated Database of labor Market Research (IDA)
and the Income Registers in Statistics Denmark see Abowd and Kramarz (1999) for a
brief description. The hourly wage rate is clearly an important individual level variable
in the analysis, and this wage rate is calculated as the sum of total labor income and
mandatory pension fund payments divided by the total number of hours worked in any
given year. The measure for total labor income as such is highly reliable since it comes
from the tax authorities, and the pension fund payments are also available in the registers.
These payments were introduced in the early 1990s, and have been rising throughout the
sample period, but not in a uniform manner across collective bargaining segments of the
labor market and they are therefore important to account for.
We use very detailed industry and occupation variables to determine the collective
agreement to which the individual belongs. The industry code follows the NACE industry
classication, and the occupation variable is based on the so-called DISCO code, which is
the Danish version of the ISCO-88 classication. We use the most disaggregated denition
of the industry- and occupation codes, i.e., the six digit NACE code and the four digit
DISCO code. By using these industry and occupation variables to dene bargaining
segments of the labor market we follow the two bargaining parties at national level, LO
and DA they use the codes to assess the economic implications of proposals for the
2To reduce estimation time we extract a 30 per cent random sample, which is used in the subsequent
regressions unless otherwise stated. This section reports summary statistics for this subsample.
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workers and employers they represent. That is, we determine the bargaining segments in
the same way as DA and LO, when the parties evaluate the bargaining outcome. However,
the construction of such bargaining segments is not completely awless. For example, a
rm may wish to stay outside its industrys collective agreement and we will not be able
to see this in the data. Nevertheless we are condent that our allocation of workers into
bargaining segments is fairly accurate since we end up with a distribution of workers
across wage setting systems that resembles Table 1 quite closely (more on this below).
We have identied 31 bargaining segments within the DA/LO segment, which correspond
to roughly 50 per cent of workers in the organized part of the private labor market in
Denmark. Coupled with information about the bargaining system each segment operates
under in each year, it was straightforward to partition all workers into the four bargaining
systems under consideration.
A long list of individual socio economic characteristics are used as control variables in
the analysis. We use dummies for gender, the presence of children, marriage, immigrant
status, city size (Large city, and Ruralwith Copenhagenas the omitted category),
education (Unskilled, Short term higher education, Long term higher educationwith
Vocational educationas the omitted category)3 and experience (measured as actual labor
market experience since 1964). There are also dummies for the size of the workplace
measured in terms of the workforce. Furthermore, di¤erent industries may face di¤erent
degrees of competition from abroad, which may well be reected in both the wage level
and the wage dispersion within a given industry. To avoid that wage setting dummies
pick up di¤erences in business conditions between industries we include a set of industry
dummies.
In Table 2 we show some summary statistics for each of the four wage setting systems
in 1997. With respect to the average wage level the unconditional evidence is mixed
3The classication of education groups rely on a Danish education code that corresponds to the
International Standard Classication of Education (ISCED). Higher educationbasically corresponds to
the two highest categories (5 and 6) in the International Standard Classication of Education (ISCED),
i.e., the individual has a tertiary education. Vocational education is dened as the nal stage of
secondary education encompassing programmes that prepare students for direct entry into the labor
market. Thus persons with just high school or equivalent or less than that are classied as Unskilled.
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since the most decentralized segment, rm-level bargaining, has the highest wage level
while the standard-rate system, which is the least decentralized wage setting system,
has the third highest wage level. To assess the extent of wage dispersion we have also
computed the unconditional 90th/10th, 90th/50th and the 50th/10th per centile ratios
for each of the wage setting systems. The wage dispersion is much higher for the workers
belonging to the minimum-wage system which is particularly true for the lower end of the
wage distribution. Wage dispersion under rm-level bargaining appear to be only slightly
higher than the remaining two wage setting systems the standard-rate system and the
minimum-pay system. It should be noted that, since the standard-rate system typically
applies for unskilled workers while many skilled workers belong to the minimum-wage
system, we should not put too much emphasis on the unconditional evidence in Table 2.
Insert Table 2 about here
With our longitudinal data set identication of the impact of wage setting system
on wages rests on the existence of workers who change wage setting system. This can
happen for two reasons; the bargaining segment may change its system as a part of the
decentralization process or the worker may change job. Table 3 tracks the persons in
our sample that change wage setting system in each year. The second column shows
the total number of workers changing wage setting system, and it is seen that there
is a transition rate of between 3 and 13 per cent each year. Column 3-6 decompose
the total annual changes further. First, the entire bargaining segment can change wage
setting system due to the decentralization process (column 3), which contributes with the
majority of transitions. Second, a worker can change occupation and/or industry and,
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thereby, perhaps also bargaining segment and wage setting system (column 4-6).4
Insert Table 3 about here
Since the wage setting system variable is constructed based on the industry and occu-
pation codes measurement error may arise in particular the occupation code is known to
be unstable within job spells in some years, and this may bias our estimates. In relation
to panel data estimations of a union membership e¤ect on wages Freeman (1984) argues
that measurement error in the union membership variable will lead to a downward-biased
estimate of the e¤ect. However, when entire bargaining segments change wage setting
system as in our data, measurement error is less of a problem compared to the situation
where we only rely on people changing jobs and, thereby, wage setting system. The data
still include job changers, however (see columns 4-6 in Table 3), so in the empirical analy-
sis below we restrict the sample further to reduce potential problems with measurement
error. Specically we throw away all workers that change wage setting system because of
a shift in the occupation code (column 5) unless they also change employer. This reduces
the number of wage setting system changes due to occupation changes by approximately
90 per cent.
The sample version of Table 1 is Table 4. Even though we only distinguish between 31
bargaining segments and, thus, leave out part of the DA/LO segment, the development
in Table 4 resembles that of Table 1 quite closely. As described above, much of the
decentralization of the bargaining level in Denmark took place before 1993, but this is
not essential to the analysis as long as we still have considerable time variation in the
data.
Insert Table 4 about here
4It should be noticed that it is only the year when a collective agreement is initiated that the wage
setting system changes. For most bargaining segments this happened every second year in the early 1990s,
i.e., the years 1991 and 1993. However, some collective agreements in 1995 and 1997 had a duration of
three years. The 523 persons whose bargaining segment seems to have changed wage setting system
because of decentralization in 1996 are persons that are in the given segment in 1994 and 1996, but out
of the sample in 1995. This is also the case for the 1,396 persons in 1998 and the 725 persons in 1999.
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5 Empirical framework
To assess the impact of decentralization on wage dispersion we use quantile regression.
Quantile regression techniques for panel data have only recently been developed, and this
section outlines the approach we follow.
The standard (cross section) quantile regression model of Koenker and Bassett (1978)
is given by
yi = xi + ui with Q (yijxi) = xi ; (1)
where i = 1; :::; N is indexing the individuals, yi is the log of the individual hourly wage
rate,  is a k  1 vector and xi is a 1  k vector of explanatory variables. Q (yijxi)
denotes the th conditional quantile of y given x,  2 (0; 1).
In the linear model the solution to endogeneity problems in presence of panel data is
typically the xed-e¤ects estimation. Unfortunately, the usual di¤erencing strategy does
not apply here since the conditional quantiles are not linear operators, that is
Q (yit   yisjxi) 6= Q (yitjxi) Q (yisjxi); (2)
where time periods t 6= s and where xi  (xi1; :::; xiT ).
Abrevaya and Dahl (2008) suggest to estimate a Chamberlainian correlated random
e¤ects quantile regression model to take account of unobserved heterogeneity. Their
estimator is most easily understood if we begin by considering the standard linear panel
data model
yit = xit + ci + uit; (3)
where t = 1; 2; :::; T , ci is the individual specic term and uit the error term.
As in Chamberlain (1982, 1984) assume that the unobservable term ci is a linear
projection onto the observables plus a disturbance vi, that is
ci =  + xi11 + :::+ xiTT + vi: (4)
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Plugging this into equation (3) gives
yit = xit +  + xi11 + :::+ xiTT + vi + uit: (5)
We need to make two assumptions in order to estimate the model in equation (5):
(A1) vi independent of xi
and
(A2) Q (uitjxi; vi) = Q (uitjxit) :
Assumption (A1) is also needed in the traditional random-e¤ects probit model (see for
example Wooldridge (2002)), but is stronger than the conditional mean independence
needed in the linear Chamberlainian random-e¤ects model. By assumption (A2) we as-
sume strict exogeneity, which e¤ectively rules out feedback-e¤ects from current wages, yit;
on future values of xit.
The partial derivative of the conditional quantile with respect to xit is
@Q (yitjxi)
@xit
=  + t +
@Q (uitjxit)
@xit
; (6)
and
@Q (yisjxi)
@xit
= t (7)
for t 6= s. Following Abrevaya and Dahl (2008) we measure the e¤ect of xit as
@Q (yitjxi)
@xit
  @Q (yisjxi)
@xit
=  +
@Q (uitjxit)
@xit
; (8)
which essentially reects the desirable feature of quantile regression that xit is allowed to
have di¤erent e¤ects on yit in di¤erent quantiles. In other words, this is a general result
of quantile regression (cf. Koenker and Bassett (1982)) and does not only pertain to the
Abrevaya and Dahl (2008) estimator. For illustrative purposes Abrevaya and Dahl (2008)
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assumes that uitjxi; ci  N
 
0; (txit)
2. This panel data version of the linear-scale model
implies that equation (8) becomes
@Q (yitjxi)
@xit
  @Q (yisjxi)
@xit
=  + tQ (it) ; (9)
where it is a standard normal random variable. It is apparent that for t > 0 the e¤ect
of xit is larger in the upper part of the yit distribution.
One drawback is that the approach only works for balanced panels. As a consequence,
we estimate the model on alternative balanced (sub-) samples. First, we construct a
sample with individuals we observe twice or more in the sample and randomly select two
observations for each individual from this set. Second, we extract a subsample with indi-
viduals observed at least four times and randomly select four observations per individual.
Third, we use the Mundlak (1978) version of the correlated random-e¤ects model where
the unobserved part is approximated by averages of the observed covariates. In this case
the unobservable term becomes
ci =  + xi+ vi: (10)
This facilitates the use of all observations, i.e. unbalanced samples, but it comes at the
expense of restricting the linear projection in equation (4).
As shown by Bache et al. (2009) the correlated random e¤ects approach works well
even for very small T . However, it relies heavily on the extent to which the linear projec-
tion provides a reasonable approximation of c: For example, if c is a pure random e¤ect
then the approach is very ine¢ cient as the included variables have poor explanatory
power. Alternatively, xed e¤ects estimators can be applied. Koenker (2004) proposes
a dummy variable based estimator for quantile regression where the problem of a large
amount of parameters to be estimated (in case of large N and small T ) is mitigated by
an added penalty term and simultaneous estimation of the desired quantiles. However
as emphasized by Bache et al. (2009) estimation for large N and small T can be a very
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di¢ cult task owing to the nature of the objective function. As in Bache et al. (2009)
we were not able to obtain any precise numerical convergence for any of the subsets we
considered using the dummy variable approach. Further, Bache et al. (2009) also shows
that when T is relatively small (as in our application) the the Koenker (2004) xed ef-
fects approach rarely do better than the correlated random e¤ect approach in terms of
estimating  precisely.
The correlated random e¤ects models (in matrix notation) can be estimated straight-
forwardly by a 1-step multivariate quantile regression of the appropriately stacked relation
y = D + r;
where y = (y01; y
0
2; : : : ; y
0
N)
0 ; and r = v+u: In the Abrevaya and Dahl (2008) model the de-
sign matrix D will contain NT rows with a typical row given as dit = (1; x0it; x0i1; : : : x0iT )0
and the coe¢ cient vector given as  = ( ; 0; 01; : : : ; 
0
T )
0
: In the mean-projected corre-
lated random e¤ects model the typical element ofD will be dit = (1; x0it; x
0
i)
0 with coe¢ cient
vector  = ( ; 0; 0)0 :
A nal comment regarding practical implementation of the sampling distribution of
coe¢ cient estimates is in order. For all of the above models, a bootstrap procedure is
the preferred method of obtaining standard errors. It is important to note that since
observations over the time dimension for individual i are not independent, the bootstrap
samples should consist of "blocks" which include all observations for the sampled cross
sectional elements. Further, as noted by Koenker (2005, page 108), sub-sampling has a
computational advantage over re-sampling with equal performance and is thus preferred
when the cross section dimension is large as in this case. For a detailed description of the
sub-sampling procedures the reader is referred to Buchinsky (1994, 1998).
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6 Results
This section rst presents results for the impact of wage setting systems on mean wages
using a standardMincer wage equation approach. This is followed by results for the impact
on wage dispersion using the panel data quantile regression approach outlined in the
previous section. Finally we present some robustness checks of our preferred specication.
6.1 Wage levels and wage-setting systems
While our focus is on the the impact of decentralization on wage dispersion it is instructive
to rst study how mean wages di¤er across wage setting systems controlling for individual
heterogeneity. Table 5 reports estimation results from a pooled OLS as well as linear
random-e¤ects, xed-e¤ects and correlated random e¤ects models.
It is rst seen that we obtain the usual signs of the human capital and socio-demographic
variables. With respect to the wage setting systems the most clean comparison is between
the standard-rate system (where wages are negotiated at sector or industry level) and rm
level bargaining since these systems represent the most centralized and the most decentral-
ized systems respectively. As described in section 3 the minimum payment and minimum
wage systems are intermediate cases as they both have elements of a centrally negotiated
wage oor and locally negotiated wage supplements. In the following we use as the base
category the standard-rate system. For the OLS regression we nd that wages are 5.3 per
cent higher under rm level bargaining than under the standard-rate system. However,
this quite substantial wage di¤erential vanishes if unobserved individual heterogeneity is
controlled for through random e¤ects or correlated random e¤ects, and if the xed e¤ects
estimator is used the e¤ect even changes sign such that wages are 1.1 per cent lower under
rm level bargaining. This clearly suggests that it is important to control for unobserved
heterogeneity and that failure to do so leads to an upward bias in the coe¢ cient, i.e., un-
observed ability may be better rewarded under local bargaining. With respect to the two
intermediate systems there is also a negative e¤ect of minimum pay once unobserved het-
erogeneity is accounted for, while there is no or a small positive wage di¤erential between
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the standard rate system and the minimum wage system.
Insert Table 5 about here
One might worry that the negative coe¢ cients to the decentralized wage-setting dum-
mies (e.g. rm-level bargaining dummy under the xed e¤ects specication) reect a
correlation between rm-level wage growth and the decentralization process that are not
captured by our control variables. For example, one can imagine that rms that experi-
ence a negative demand shock will push for wages to be negotiated at the rm level. It is
important here to note that the bargaining regime is agreed on by central unions and em-
ployers associations, so the decentralization process should be exogenous to the individual
rm. Still, if entire industries are hit by negative shocks there could be a correlation. To
capture such e¤ects we have extended the models from Table 5 to include also industry
specic time trends that should pick up declining wage trends. This extension had a
negligible impact on the estimated coe¢ cients to the wage-setting system dummies.5
To sum up, we nd evidence of no wage di¤erentials or even lower mean wages un-
der the more decentralized bargaining systems, and this seems to be at odds with what
is expected from simple rent-sharing or e¢ ciency-wage considerations, while it is more
consistent with the externality explanation of Calmfors and Dri¢ l (1988) as argued in
the introduction. Also, it is important to be able to control for unobserved heterogeneity
as otherwise the wage di¤erentials between wage-setting systems are greatly exaggerated.
One important aspect which cannot be studied using the simple mean regressions is the
fact that the decentralization process may have very uneven e¤ects across the wage dis-
tribution an issue to which we now turn.
5For example, the coe¢ cient to rm-level bargaining in the xed e¤ects specication changed from
-0.011 to -0.009 (still signicant). We proceed without the industry specic time trends as the estimation
time for the panel data quantile regression models in the next section increases dramatically with the
number of control variables.
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6.2 Wage dispersion and wage-setting systems
As a rst step we will start out with a simple quantile regression without exploiting the
longitudinal nature of our data. Table 6 displays the results from pooled quantile regres-
sion models for the quantiles 0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, and 0.90. In general the coe¢ cients on
the individual level variables are fairly constant across the di¤erent quantiles, but there
are also some notable exceptions. For example women and immigrants have a higher
wage penalty in the top end of the wage distribution, which suggests the existence of
a glass ceiling for these groups in the labor market (this is consistent with the results
of Albrecht, Björklund and Vroman (2003) and Pendakur and Woodcock (2008)). Also,
unskilled workers have relatively lower wages than workers with vocational education in
the bottom of the wage distribution.
Of particular interest is the e¤ect of the wage system dummies, and it is found that the
coe¢ cient on the variables for the three decentralized systems increases over almost all
of the reported quantiles, so that the e¤ects at the 90th quantile are substantially higher
compared to the e¤ects at the 10th quantile. For example the e¤ect of working under
rm-level bargaining compared to the standard-rate system almost triples from the 10th
to the 90th quantile (from 4.1 per cent to 11.5 per cent). Thus these results support the
prediction that decentralization leads to increased wage dispersion for example because
rm- and individual-specic characteristics are more likely to enter wage contracts, or
because egalitarian union preferences become more di¢ cult to accomplish. However, we
suspect that the coe¢ cients on the wage system dummies are biased upwards because
unobserved heterogeneity is not controlled for.
Insert Table 6 about here
The next step is to apply the panel data quantile regression techniques outlined in
section 5. Table 7 shows results for estimation of the Abrevaya and Dahl (2008) correlated
random-e¤ects quantile regression model for the case where we balance the panel by
randomly selecting only two observations for each individual for the reasons explained
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above. It is rst noted that the e¤ects of individual level variables only change slightly.
Some variables like age and experience appear to have somewhat stronger e¤ects now,
but otherwise the results are robust. However, for the wage system dummies the picture
changes in important ways. For rm level bargaining we nd again that wage dispersion
is higher than under the standard-rate system, but the coe¢ cients are in accordance
with the fact that there is roughly no mean e¤ects, cf. Table 5. That is, we nd negative
coe¢ cients in the lower quantiles and positive coe¢ cients in the higher quantiles such that
workers under rm-level bargaining earn 2.1 per cent lower wages at the 10th quantile and
4.0 per cent higher wages at the 90th quantile compared to workers under the standard-
rate system. There appears to be no signicant di¤erences between the minimum-pay
system and the standard-rate system, while the minimum-wage system increases wages
in the upper part of the wage distribution.
Insert Table 7 about here
To study how these results depend on the sampling scheme we also estimate the corre-
lated random-e¤ects quantile regression model where we randomly select four instead of
two observations for each worker. This e¤ectively corresponds to selecting stable workers
in the sense that they enter the original sample at least four out of the six years in our
sample window. With respect to the rm-level bargaining system the results are quali-
tatively similar but the e¤ects are slightly stronger such that workers now earn 3.4 per
cent lower wages at the 10th quantile and 2.4 per cent higher wages at the 90th quantile
compared to workers under the standard-rate system, see Table 8. The minimum-pay
system now has a negative e¤ect in the 10th quantile but there are no changes otherwise,
and the e¤ects of the minimum-wage system are also not changed in any important way.
Insert Table 8 about here
To cast further light on the importance of the sampling scheme we also estimate a ver-
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sion of the correlated random e¤ects quantile regression model where we approximate the
unobservable part with the individual means of the explanatory variables as in Mundlak
(1978), see equation (10). This has the advantage that we can use all observations in our
original sample and thus circumvent the requirement of a balanced sample, but it comes
at the expense of a more restrictive functional form for the unobservables. The results
are displayed in Table 9, and it is seen that they are very much in accordance with the
two previous sets of results. At the 90th quantile the e¤ect of rm-level bargaining lie
in between the e¤ects found for the balanced sample with two observations per worker
and the balanced sample with four observation per worker. At the bottom of the wage
distribution the e¤ect is somewhat closer to zero but still signicantly negative.
Insert Table 9 about here
To sum up, the three di¤erent versions of the correlated-random e¤ects quantile re-
gression model yield fairly robust results showing that decentralization of wage bargaining
increases wage dispersion. Under the most clear cut comparison, i.e. the e¤ect of working
under rm-level bargaining (where wages are set entirely at the rm level) compared to
the standard-rate system (where wages are set entirely at the sector level) negative ef-
fects are found in the lower part of the wage distribution and positive e¤ects are found
in the upper part. For the two intermediate bargaining systems  the minimum-pay
and the minimum-wage systems wages are only slightly more dispersed than under the
standard-rate system.
In the following we will take the Mundlak version of the empirical model as our main
specication as it yields very similar results to the more exible models while still being
based on the full sample. For illustrative purposes we have used this model to compute
the coe¢ cients for every two per centiles and plot them with 5 per cent condence bands
see Figure 1. This shows very clearly that wage dispersion is higher under rm level
bargaining.
Insert Figure 1 about here
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6.3 Robustness
A major advantage of our analysis vis-à-vis the existing literature is that we exploit time
variation in the wage system of the individual worker, but this also raises the question
about whether wage system changes are exogenous. We argue that if the wage system
change because of the decentralization process, i.e. a whole bargaining segment changes
wage system, then this can safely be taken to be exogenous to the worker. The wage
system may also change because workers change jobs from one bargaining segment of the
labor market to another, and in this case endogeneity may be an issue as e.g. high paid
workers in the standard-rate system may be inclined to change to jobs under rm-level
bargaining to receive a higher wage. In traditional Mincer human capital wage equations
this issue may be approached by also estimating a selection equation for the choice of
wage system (see e.g. Vella and Verbeek (1998) for an application to union wage premia).
However, corresponding techniques are not yet developed for the panel data quantile
regression case, and in any case this approach also requires proper instruments which is
not immediately available in our data. Therefore, to proceed we have to settle for more
indirect evidence for exogeneity of the wage system variables.
Table 3 showed that most wage system changes are due to the decentralization process,
so a straightforward sensitivity test would be to simply leave out all wage system changes
that can be ascribed to job changes. However, our reference wage system is the standard-
rate system because it represents the most clear-cut example of a wage system with wage
determined solely at the sector level, but no bargaining segments changed to or from
the standard-rate system during our sample window (see Tables 1 and 4), so we have to
rely on job movers. In the following, we study whether these job changes are plagued by
endogeneity.
The rst step is to provide some further descriptive statistics for the wage system
changes. According to Table 3, there are 45,314 wage system changes in the data, and
almost two thirds of these are due to the decentralization process and the rest is job
mobility. Among job changes involving the standard rate system the most frequent type
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is between the standard rate system and the minimum pay system more than one third
of all job changes are in this category. In fact only very few workers change job from the
standard-rate system to a job under rm-level bargaining or vice versa, but once we can
identify the wage e¤ects of changing between the standard-rate system and minimum-pay
we have also identied the e¤ects of rm-level bargaining because of su¢ ciently many
exogenous decentralizationtransitions between minimum-pay and rm-level bargaining.
Since most of the mobility in and out of the standard-rate system is to/from the
minimum-pay system and since identication therefore relies on this transition in partic-
ular we will now study potential endogeneity of this transition only. One way to do this
is to include two additional dummy variables for a change between the two wage systems,
i.e. the variable Change standard-rate to minimum-payin Table 10 takes the value 1 if
the worker has experienced this transition as the latest transition and 0 otherwise. If mo-
bility is endogenous we would expect that these variables enter the model with signicant
e¤ects. Wages should rise in the top end of the wage distribution if workers change to the
more decentral minimum-pay system and they should fall in the bottom end. Likewise
wages should fall in the top end of the wage distribution if workers change to the cen-
tralized standard-rate system and they should rise in the bottom end. However, we nd
no evidence for such e¤ects all coe¢ cients on the change variables are insignicant in
the tails of the wage distribution. At the same time the direct e¤ects of the wage system
dummies have only changed slightly.
Insert Table 10 about here
The next question is whether we would get similar results to the main results of Table
9 if in addition to the exogenous decentralizationtransitions we rely only on job movers
between the standard-rate system and the minimum-wage system, i.e. if we remove all
observations involving other types of job mobility. A Comparison between the results of
Table 9 and 11 shows only small changes in the coe¢ cients on the wage system variables,
so mobility between standard-rate and minimum-wage systems is su¢ cient to get the main
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results and these job changes appear not to be driven by wage concerns. We take this as
evidence for our main results not being seriously plagued by endogenity bias through job
mobility.
Insert Table 11 about here
7 Conclusion
Many European labor markets have undergone a process towards more decentralized wage
bargaining during recent decades. Such changes may have important welfare implications
both in terms of e¢ ciency and equity. When wages are negotiated locally at the rm
level as opposed to more centralized bargaining, they are more likely to reect individual
productivity and rm specic conditions. This should lead to increased wage dispersion.
We use a unique register-based panel data set covering a period of decentralization in
the Danish labor market, and to the best of our knowledge we are the rst to study these
questions using longitudinal data. This is a crucial element because the time variation
allows us to identify the e¤ects of decentralization as many workers have seen their wage
setting system change as a result of the decentralization process. In contrast, the existing
literature has relied on cross section data. Also, in contrast to previous studies, the lon-
gitudinal dimension allows us to control for unobserved individual heterogeneity. This is
important because by doing so the wage structure di¤erences across wage-setting systems
are substantially narrowed down.
We nd empirical evidence in support of the predictions from theory, i.e., wage disper-
sion is higher under the more decentralized wage setting systems. In our main specication
workers under rm-level bargaining, where wages are set entirely at the rm level, earn
1.7 per cent lower wages at the 10th quantile and 3.2 per cent higher wages at the 90th
quantile compared to workers under the standard-rate system, where wages are entirely
set at the sector level.
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Firm-level bargaining Minimum pay Minimum wage
Figure 1: Abrevaya-Dahl Mundlak quantile regression
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Table 1: Private sector wage setting systems 1989-2004
1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 2000 2004
Standard-rate 34 19 16 16 16 15 16
Minimum-wage 32 37 13 12 21 23 27
Minimum-pay 30 40 67 61 46 42 35
Firm level 4 4 4 11 17 20 22
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Danish EmployersFederation (DA).
Table 2: Wage dispersion in 1997 by type of wage-setting system
No. of obs Mean 90th/10th 50th/10th 90th/50th
Standard-rate 15,950 150.56 1.90 1.37 1.38
Minimum wage 28,162 139.01 2.88 1.89 1.52
Minimum payment 64,578 153.43 1.90 1.33 1.42
Firm level bargaining 23,086 156.04 2.06 1.39 1.48
Notes: The numbers are based on the 30 % sample of workers.
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Table 3: Transitions between wage-setting systems 1995-1999
No. of All Decentra- Change in Change in Change in
obs. changes lization occ. and occupation industry
industry
1994 123,851 . . . . .
1995 124,672 12,761 10,795 869 701 396
1996 126,514 3,769 523 1,611 1,047 588
1997 131,776 16,938 12,809 2,440 964 725
1998 135,355 5,863 1,396 2,839 934 694
1999 138,219 5,983 725 3,146 1,411 701
Total no. of obs. 780,387 45,314 26,248 10,905 5,057 3,104
Notes: The numbers are based on the 30 % sample of workers.
Table 4: Private sector wage-setting systems 1994-1999
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Standard-rate 12.6 11.6 11.9 12.1 12.0 12.3
Minimum wage 13.5 13.8 13.7 21.4 21.2 21.6
Minimum pay 73.3 62.2 62.3 49.0 49.3 48.6
Firm level bargaining 0.6 12.4 12.2 17.5 17.5 17.5
Total no. of obs. 123,851 124,672 126,514 131,776 135,355 138,219
Notes: The numbers are based on the 30 % sample of workers.
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Table 5: Linear panel data models
OLS Random e¤ects Fixed e¤ects Correlatedrandom e¤ects
Firm-level bargaining 0.053 -0.002 -0.011 0.003
(0:002) (0:002) (0:003) (0:003)
Minimum pay 0.000 -0.014 -0.020 -0.008
(0:001) (0:002) (0:003) (0:002)
Minimum wage 0.042 0.002 0.005 0.009
(0:001) (0:002) (0:003) (0:003)
Age/10 0.487 0.536 0.753
(0:003) (0:004) (0:010)
Age squared/100 -0.056 -0.062 -0.083 -0.064
(0:000) (0:000) (0:001) (0:001)
Woman -0.154 -0.127 -0.130
(0:001) (0:001) (0:001)
Children aged 0-6 years 0.044 0.011 0.000 0.002
(0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001)
Non-western immigrant -0.023 -0.004 -0.017
(0:002) (0:003) (0:003)
Large city -0.07 -0.059 -0.020 -0.058
(0:001) (0:002) (0:004) (0:002)
Rural -0.077 -0.066 -0.051 -0.063
(0:001) (0:001) (0:003) (0:001)
Experience/10 0.171 0.153 0.246 0.227
(0:002) (0:003) (0:008) (0:007)
Experience squared/100 -0.032 -0.030 -0.056 -0.044
(0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001)
Unskilled -0.113 -0.277 -0.276
(0:001) (0:001) (0:001)
Short term higher education 0.057 -0.009 -0.013
(0:001) (0:003) (0:003)
Long term education 0.177 0.113 0.105
(0:002) (0:003) (0:003)
Workplace size, 16-50 workers 0.039 0.032 0.026 0.024
(0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001)
Workplace size, 51-200 workers 0.074 0.067 0.052 0.048
(0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001)
Workplace size, 200+ workers 0.107 0.094 0.070 0.066
(0:001) (0:001) (0:002) (0:001)
Observations 762,211 762,211 762,211 762,211
Number of workers 240,480 240,480 240,480 240,480
R-squared 0.42 0.38 0.04 0.39
Notes: The results are based on the 30 % sample of workers. Year and industry dummies
were included in all regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Signicant at 5%;
 Signicant at 1%. The reported R2s do not include the contribution of individual xed or random e¤ects.
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Table 6: Pooled quantile regression
Quantile Regressions
10 25 50 75 90 OLS
Firm-level bargaining 0.041 *** 0.045 *** 0.059 *** 0.090 *** 0.115 *** 0.057 ***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Minimum pay 0.002 -0.005 ** -0.003 * 0.011 *** 0.029 *** -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Minimum wage 0.023 *** 0.020 *** 0.041 *** 0.072 *** 0.100 *** 0.042 ***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Age/10 0.682 *** 0.513 *** 0.314 *** 0.283 *** 0.285 *** 0.473 ***
(0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.005)
Age squared/100 -0.079 *** -0.059 *** -0.037 *** -0.033 *** -0.033 *** -0.055 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Woman -0.123 *** -0.143 *** -0.165 *** -0.181 *** -0.196 *** -0.158 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Children aged 0-6 0.064 *** 0.050 *** 0.030 *** 0.029 *** 0.030 *** 0.043 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Non-western immigrant 0.007 -0.013 *** -0.031 *** -0.047 *** -0.059 *** -0.023 ***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
Large city -0.068 *** -0.078 *** -0.077 *** -0.075 *** -0.067 *** -0.072 ***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Rural -0.075 *** -0.086 *** -0.085 *** -0.082 *** -0.077 *** -0.079 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Experience/10 0.260 *** 0.202 *** 0.147 *** 0.114 *** 0.097 *** 0.178 ***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
Experience squared/100 -0.049 *** -0.039 *** -0.027 *** -0.018 *** -0.014 *** -0.034 ***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Unskilled -0.111 *** -0.110 *** -0.079 *** -0.067 *** -0.061 *** -0.110 ***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
Short term higher education 0.068 *** 0.068 *** 0.067 *** 0.065 *** 0.059 *** 0.057 ***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Long term higher education 0.121 *** 0.156 *** 0.187 *** 0.204 *** 0.230 *** 0.174 ***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004)
Workplace size, 16-50 workers 0.029 *** 0.035 *** 0.032 *** 0.035 *** 0.034 *** 0.036 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Workplace size, 51-200 workers 0.061 *** 0.063 *** 0.057 *** 0.061 *** 0.062 *** 0.069 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Workplace size, 200+ workers 0.099 *** 0.102 *** 0.094 *** 0.094 *** 0.084 *** 0.103 ***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Notes: The results are based on the 30% sample of workers. Year and industry dummies were included in all
regressions. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses. The bootstrap uses a subsample size of
10.000 persons and 1.000 replications. * Signiﬁcant at 10%; ** Signiﬁcant at 5%; *** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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Table 7: Abrevaya-Dahl quantile regression, 2 observations pr. individual
Quantile Regressions
10 25 50 75 90 OLS
Firm-level bargaining -0.021 ** -0.009 -0.002 0.017 ** 0.040 *** 0.008
(0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.007)
Minimum pay -0.006 -0.003 -0.006 0.001 0.018 * 0.002
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007)
Minimum wage -0.008 0.024 *** 0.026 *** 0.022 *** 0.035 *** 0.026 ***
(0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.007)
Age/10 0.858 *** 0.901 *** 0.570 *** 0.488 *** 0.494 *** 0.778 ***
(0.058) (0.040) (0.032) (0.034) (0.040) (0.031)
Age squared/100 -0.126 *** -0.101 *** -0.060 *** -0.047 *** -0.043 *** -0.085 ***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002)
Woman -0.115 *** -0.134 *** -0.161 *** -0.180 *** -0.198 *** -0.153 ***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
Children aged 0-6 0.065 *** 0.054 *** 0.033 *** 0.029 *** 0.030 *** 0.044 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Non-western immigrant 0.008 -0.007 -0.025 *** -0.042 *** -0.052 *** -0.018 ***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
Large city -0.065 *** -0.074 *** -0.077 *** -0.073 *** -0.067 *** -0.070 ***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Rural -0.071 *** -0.083 *** -0.082 *** -0.077 *** -0.074 *** -0.074 ***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Experience/10 0.839 *** 0.434 *** 0.217 *** 0.133 *** 0.082 ** 0.330 ***
(0.057) (0.036) (0.025) (0.029) (0.035) (0.027)
Experience squared/100 -0.094 *** -0.066 *** -0.035 *** -0.022 *** -0.021 *** -0.049 ***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003)
Unskilled -0.119 *** -0.126 *** -0.092 *** -0.074 *** -0.066 *** -0.121 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001)
Short term higher education 0.060 *** 0.065 *** 0.058 *** 0.058 *** 0.053 *** 0.052 ***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
Long term higher education 0.119 *** 0.162 *** 0.181 *** 0.199 *** 0.223 *** 0.172 ***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004)
Workplace size, 16-50 workers 0.028 *** 0.027 *** 0.025 *** 0.021 *** 0.026 *** 0.027 ***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Workplace size, 51-200 workers 0.055 *** 0.053 *** 0.047 *** 0.045 *** 0.053 *** 0.056 ***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
Workplace size, 200+ workers 0.076 *** 0.072 *** 0.074 *** 0.070 *** 0.077 *** 0.080 ***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
Notes: The results are based on the 30% sample of workers. Year and industry dummies were included in all
regressions. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses. The bootstrap uses a subsample size of
10.000 persons and 1.000 replications. * Signiﬁcant at 10%; ** Signiﬁcant at 5%; *** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
35
Table 8: Abrevaya-Dahl quantile regression, 4 observations pr. individual
Quantile Regressions
10 25 50 75 90 OLS
Firm-level bargaining -0.034 *** -0.020 *** -0.008 0.010 0.024 ** -0.004
(0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011) (0.006)
Minimum pay -0.013 -0.016 ** -0.018 *** -0.008 0.001 -0.011 *
(0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.006)
Minimum wage -0.011 0.018 ** 0.007 0.014 * 0.012 0.009
(0.010) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011) (0.006)
Age/10 1.010 *** 0.752 *** 0.556 *** 0.506 *** 0.501 *** 0.821 ***
(0.060) (0.043) (0.034) (0.038) (0.046) (0.026)
Age squared/100 -0.117 *** -0.070 *** -0.044 *** -0.039 *** -0.038 *** -0.071 ***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Woman -0.131 *** -0.152 *** -0.176 *** -0.192 *** -0.206 *** -0.171 ***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Children aged 0-6 0.047 *** 0.031 *** 0.024 *** 0.025 *** 0.026 *** 0.035 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Non-western immigrant 0.001 -0.019 *** -0.034 *** -0.049 *** -0.053 *** -0.029 ***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005)
Large city -0.074 *** -0.078 *** -0.075 *** -0.072 *** -0.061 *** -0.071 ***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Rural -0.081 *** -0.086 *** -0.083 *** -0.080 *** -0.072 *** -0.078 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Experience/10 0.642 *** 0.238 *** 0.059 *** 0.009 -0.002 0.158 ***
(0.064) (0.036) (0.023) (0.023) (0.031) (0.021)
Experience squared/100 -0.098 *** -0.058 *** -0.035 *** -0.023 *** -0.018 *** -0.053 ***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Unskilled -0.095 *** -0.080 *** -0.060 *** -0.052 *** -0.050 *** -0.087 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Short term higher education 0.063 *** 0.065 *** 0.066 *** 0.062 *** 0.055 *** 0.057 ***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
Long term higher education 0.112 *** 0.151 *** 0.191 *** 0.202 *** 0.222 *** 0.176 ***
(0.010) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.006)
Workplace size, 16-50 workers 0.024 *** 0.023 *** 0.021 *** 0.024 *** 0.021 *** 0.024 ***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Workplace size, 51-200 workers 0.046 *** 0.040 *** 0.040 *** 0.047 *** 0.047 *** 0.048 ***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Workplace size, 200+ workers 0.060 *** 0.058 *** 0.060 *** 0.062 *** 0.051 *** 0.063 ***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
Notes: The results are based on the 30% sample of workers. Year and industry dummies were included in all
regressions. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses. The bootstrap uses a subsample size of
10.000 persons and 1.000 replications. * Signiﬁcant at 10%; ** Signiﬁcant at 5%; *** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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Table 9: Abrevaya-Dahl Mundlak quantile regression, all observations pr. individual
Quantile Regressions
10 25 50 75 90 OLS
Firm-level bargaining -0.017 *** -0.018 *** -0.006 0.008 0.032 *** 0.004
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005)
Minimum pay -0.007 -0.014 ** -0.014 *** -0.008 0.010 -0.006
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005)
Minimum wage -0.006 0.014 ** 0.012 ** 0.013 * 0.033 *** 0.018 ***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.005)
Age/10 1.112 *** 1.014 *** 0.664 *** 0.597 *** 0.595 *** 0.896 ***
(0.031) (0.025) (0.022) (0.027) (0.031) (0.020)
Age squared/100 -0.108 *** -0.085 *** -0.051 *** -0.043 *** -0.041 *** -0.073 ***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
Woman -0.126 *** -0.145 *** -0.168 *** -0.185 *** -0.199 *** -0.161 ***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
Children aged 0-6 0.063 *** 0.049 *** 0.031 *** 0.030 *** 0.031 *** 0.044 ***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Non-western immigrant 0.007 -0.011 *** -0.028 *** -0.044 *** -0.055 *** -0.021 ***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
Large city -0.067 *** -0.076 *** -0.076 *** -0.073 *** -0.064 *** -0.070 ***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Rural -0.074 *** -0.084 *** -0.082 *** -0.079 *** -0.073 *** -0.076 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Experience/10 0.542 *** 0.308 *** 0.153 *** 0.092 *** 0.046 ** 0.244 ***
(0.030) (0.021) (0.016) (0.019) (0.023) (0.017)
Experience squared/100 -0.080 *** -0.060 *** -0.037 *** -0.024 *** -0.021 *** -0.050 ***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
Unskilled -0.110 *** -0.108 *** -0.078 *** -0.066 *** -0.060 *** -0.108 ***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
Short term higher education 0.061 *** 0.062 *** 0.059 *** 0.057 *** 0.053 *** 0.052 ***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Long term higher education 0.120 *** 0.154 *** 0.180 *** 0.193 *** 0.216 *** 0.169 ***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004)
Workplace size, 16-50 workers 0.025 *** 0.025 *** 0.021 *** 0.023 *** 0.025 *** 0.025 ***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Workplace size, 51-200 workers 0.048 *** 0.047 *** 0.041 *** 0.045 *** 0.050 *** 0.050 ***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Workplace size, 200+ workers 0.065 *** 0.064 *** 0.061 *** 0.062 *** 0.062 *** 0.067 ***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Notes: The results are based on the 30% sample of workers. Year and industry dummies were included in all
regressions. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses. The bootstrap uses a subsample size of
10.000 persons and 1.000 replications. * Signiﬁcant at 10%; ** Signiﬁcant at 5%; *** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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Table 10: Abrevaya-Dahl Mundlak quantile regression with change dummies, all observa-
tions pr. individual
Quantile Regressions
10 25 50 75 90 OLS
Firm-level bargaining -0.022 ** -0.012 0.001 0.005 0.025 ** 0.003
(0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.007)
Minimum pay -0.012 -0.009 -0.007 -0.011 0.003 -0.006
(0.010) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007)
Minimum wage -0.010 0.018 ** 0.019 *** 0.010 0.027 ** 0.017 **
(0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.012) (0.007)
Change standard rate to minimum pay -0.002 -0.011 * -0.014 ** -0.004 -0.001 0.001
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007)
Change minimum pay to standard rate -0.012 -0.001 0.001 -0.013 ** -0.014 -0.002
(0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007)
Age/10 1.109 *** 1.013 *** 0.672 *** 0.608 *** 0.605 *** 0.896 ***
(0.030) (0.024) (0.021) (0.026) (0.032) (0.020)
Age squared/100 -0.107 *** -0.084 *** -0.051 *** -0.044 *** -0.042 *** -0.073 ***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
Woman -0.127 *** -0.146 *** -0.168 *** -0.184 *** -0.198 *** -0.161 ***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
Children aged 0-6 0.062 *** 0.049 *** 0.031 *** 0.030 *** 0.031 *** 0.044 ***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Non-western immigrant 0.006 -0.011 *** -0.028 *** -0.043 *** -0.054 *** -0.021 ***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
Large city -0.067 *** -0.076 *** -0.075 *** -0.073 *** -0.064 *** -0.070 ***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Rural -0.074 *** -0.083 *** -0.082 *** -0.079 *** -0.073 *** -0.076 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Experience/10 0.530 *** 0.304 *** 0.157 *** 0.097 *** 0.052 ** 0.244 ***
(0.029) (0.021) (0.015) (0.018) (0.023) (0.017)
Experience squared/100 -0.079 *** -0.060 *** -0.037 *** -0.025 *** -0.022 *** -0.050 ***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
Unskilled -0.110 *** -0.108 *** -0.079 *** -0.067 *** -0.061 *** -0.108 ***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
Short term higher education 0.061 *** 0.062 *** 0.059 *** 0.056 *** 0.052 *** 0.052 ***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Long term higher education 0.122 *** 0.154 *** 0.180 *** 0.193 *** 0.215 *** 0.169 ***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004)
Workplace size, 16-50 workers 0.024 *** 0.025 *** 0.021 *** 0.023 *** 0.025 *** 0.025 ***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Workplace size, 51-200 workers 0.048 *** 0.047 *** 0.042 *** 0.046 *** 0.051 *** 0.050 ***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Workplace size, 200+ workers 0.065 *** 0.065 *** 0.062 *** 0.062 *** 0.062 *** 0.067 ***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Notes: The results are based on the 30% sample of workers. Year and industry dummies were included in all
regressions. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses. The bootstrap uses a subsample size of
10.000 persons and 1.000 replications. * Signiﬁcant at 10%; ** Signiﬁcant at 5%; *** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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Table 11: Abrevaya-Dahl Mundlak quantile regression, exogenous changes, all observations
pr. individual
Quantile Regressions
10 25 50 75 90 OLS
Firm-level bargaining -0.022 *** -0.014 ** -0.002 0.018 *** 0.042 *** 0.013 ***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.005)
Minimum pay -0.012 * -0.011 * -0.013 ** -0.003 0.016 * 0.001
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.005)
Minimum wage -0.017 ** 0.028 *** 0.021 *** 0.027 *** 0.051 *** 0.034 ***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.010) (0.005)
Age/10 1.154 *** 1.047 *** 0.674 *** 0.602 *** 0.589 *** 0.921 ***
(0.036) (0.026) (0.021) (0.024) (0.029) (0.019)
Age squared/100 -0.109 *** -0.084 *** -0.049 *** -0.041 *** -0.037 *** -0.072 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
Woman -0.126 *** -0.145 *** -0.169 *** -0.186 *** -0.201 *** -0.162 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Children aged 0-6 0.064 *** 0.051 *** 0.031 *** 0.029 *** 0.031 *** 0.044 ***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Non-western immigrant 0.010 ** -0.008 * -0.027 *** -0.041 *** -0.054 *** -0.018 ***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Large city -0.067 *** -0.076 *** -0.075 *** -0.071 *** -0.062 *** -0.070 ***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Rural -0.074 *** -0.084 *** -0.082 *** -0.079 *** -0.073 *** -0.076 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Experience/10 0.523 *** 0.264 *** 0.120 *** 0.061 *** 0.026 0.210 ***
(0.032) (0.022) (0.015) (0.018) (0.019) (0.014)
Experience squared/100 -0.080 *** -0.058 *** -0.035 *** -0.024 *** -0.022 *** -0.050 ***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Unskilled -0.108 *** -0.107 *** -0.077 *** -0.065 *** -0.059 *** -0.108 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Short term higher education 0.060 *** 0.062 *** 0.060 *** 0.056 *** 0.051 *** 0.051 ***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Long term higher education 0.116 *** 0.151 *** 0.181 *** 0.195 *** 0.219 *** 0.169 ***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005)
Workplace size, 16-50 workers 0.023 *** 0.022 *** 0.020 *** 0.021 *** 0.024 *** 0.023 ***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Workplace size, 51-200 workers 0.045 *** 0.041 *** 0.038 *** 0.045 *** 0.051 *** 0.047 ***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Workplace size, 200+ workers 0.060 *** 0.056 *** 0.057 *** 0.061 *** 0.062 *** 0.062 ***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Notes: The results are based on the 30% sample of workers. Year and industry dummies were included in all
regressions. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses. The bootstrap uses a subsample size of
10.000 persons and 1.000 replications. * Signiﬁcant at 10%; ** Signiﬁcant at 5%; *** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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